Dalhousie Law Journal
Volume 44

Issue 2

Article 2

8-2021

But Why Him? A Review of The Tenth Justice: Judicial
Appointments, Marc Nadon, and the Supreme Court Act
Reference, by Carissima Mathen and Michael Plaxton
Andrew Flavelle Martin
Schulich School of Law, Dalhousie University

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.schulichlaw.dal.ca/dlj
Part of the Common Law Commons, Comparative and Foreign Law Commons, International Law
Commons, Legal Education Commons, and the Public Law and Legal Theory Commons

This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License.
Recommended Citation
Andrew Flavelle Martin, Book Review of The Tenth Justice: Judicial Appointments, Marc Nadon, and the
Supreme Court Reference by Carissima Mathen & Michael Plaxton, (2021) 44:2 Dal LJ.

This Book Review is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Schulich Law Scholars. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Dalhousie Law Journal by an authorized editor of Schulich Law Scholars. For more
information, please contact hannah.steeves@dal.ca.

Book Review
But Why Him? A Review of The Tenth Justice: Judicial Appointments,
Marc Nadon, and the Supreme Court Act Reference, by Carissima Mathen
and Michael Plaxton.

How and why did a narrow question of statutory interpretation
explode into a gripping public spectacle? This question, among others,
is answered in The Tenth Justice: Judicial Appointments, Marc Nadon,
and the Supreme Court Act Reference by Carissima Mathen and Michael
Plaxton.1
To the great benefit of the Canadian legal community and the
Canadian public, the authors have created an extensive, concise, and
highly readable account of the Nadon saga. Anyone unfamiliar with the
purported appointment of Justice Nadon to the Supreme Court of Canada,
the Reference re Supreme Court Act, ss 5 and 6 (also known as the Nadon
Reference),2 and the aftermath will find this book invaluable. I expect this
work will become the definitive and authoritative account of this saga and
that it will be indispensable to future scholars.3
I begin this review with a brief overview of the content and organization
of the book. Within that context, I then focus on the debates the book raises
and provokes and on the mysteries that remain for future work.
At the outset, I highlight some fascinating nuggets nestled in the book.
These include the “real” reason why Justice Rothstein recused himself from
the Reference;4 the continuing (and unsuccessful) adventures of Rocco
Galati around challenging judicial appointments;5 and the questionable
validity of the Supreme Court’s declaration in the Reference that Nadon’s
appointment was void, given that the matter was a reference and Nadon
was not a party to the proceeding.6 (It is this last discussion in which
Nadon jokingly implies he “‘may still be a Supreme Court judge in law’…
[as the] order-in-council appointing him was never revoked” that appears
to prompt the book’s title, The Tenth Justice, the meaning of which was

1.
Carissima Mathen & Michael Plaxton, The Tenth Justice: Judicial Appointments, Marc Nadon,
and the Supreme Court Act Reference (Vancouver and Toronto: UBC Press, 2020) [Mathen & Plaxton].
2.
Reference re Supreme Court Act, ss 5 and 6, 2014 SCC 21 [Reference].
3.
Eric M Adams describes the book as “deft, compelling, and illuminating” and “a definitive
account”: Mathen & Plaxton, supra note 1 at rear cover.
4.
Ibid at 85-87.
5.
Ibid at 99, 140-141.
6.
Ibid at 183-184.
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unclear until that point.7) The book also helpfully includes as an appendix
the full text of the legal memorandum by the Honourable Ian Binnie that
was commissioned and relied upon by the government.8
Content and organization
The book is organized in nine chapters. The authors begin with an
Introduction previewing why the Reference is a “landmark.”9 They anchor
this characterization in the growing importance and profile of the Supreme
Court of Canada and the long-term impact of the Reference on that Court.
In Chapter 1, “What’s So Bad About Marc Nadon?,” the authors
outline the major criticisms of Nadon’s selection: that he lacked the
criminal law expertise of the judge whom he replaced,10 that his maritime
law expertise was of marginal utility for the Supreme Court of Canada,11
that he was a supernumerary judge,12 that he was suspected to have been
chosen largely for his deferential dissent in Canada (Prime Minister) v
Khadr,13 that he would detract from the Court’s diversity,14 and of course
that he was potentially ineligible for one of the three “Quebec” seats on
the Court.15 The authors push back primarily against the Khadr criticism,
by examining some of Justice Nadon’s other decisions and cautioning that
“[w]hen assessing a judge’s entire career, one shouldn’t make too much of
a single case.”16
In Chapter 2, “The Prime Minister’s Prerogative,” the authors briefly
explain the statutory and constitutional basis for the appointment power,17
but their focus is on how the appointments process has changed over time,
with an emphasis on the role of political considerations.18 Particularly
helpful is a concise description of how the appointments process—or rather,
the process built around the bare appointments themselves—had rapidly
mutated since 2004.19 The authors conclude that the various versions of
7.
Ibid at 183.
8.
Ibid at 185-192.
9.
Ibid at 7.
10. Ibid at 12-13.
11. Ibid at 13.
12. Ibid at 13-14
13. Ibid at 14-16; Canada (Prime Minister) v Khadr, 2009 FCA 246 [Khadr], rev’d in part 2010 SCC
3. The authors dismiss this criticism as “fuss” (Mathen & Plaxton, supra note 1 at 18). The authors
later at 133 note that “[w]hether warranted or not, Federal Court judges had a reputation in some legal
circles for being too deferential to government.”
14. Ibid at 19.
15. Ibid at 19-20.
16. Ibid at 16-18 (quotation is from 16).
17. Ibid at 22-24.
18. Ibid at 24-37.
19. Ibid at 27-37.
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the process “turned the nominee into a kind of proxy target for critics
of the prime minister”; “Insofar as anyone was made accountable by the
process, it was the judges who were nominated, not the prime minister
who appointed them.”20
Chapters 3 (“Memos”) and 4 (“Asking and Telling”) focus on the
steps taken by the Stephen Harper government before and up to the point
that the Governor in Council initiated the Reference. Chapter 3 explains
the eligibility issue and the government’s legal opinions, focusing on
the memorandum it commissioned from the Honourable Ian Binnie,
the government’s public use of that memorandum, and criticisms of it.21
Most surprising is the authors’ discovery and discussion of a predecessor
judicial eligibility affair within the federal government in 1940.22 Chapter
4 outlines the relevant declaratory amendments to the Supreme Court Act
and the questions referred to the Supreme Court of Canada, and considers
to some extent the controversy over doing both at once.23 The authors
themselves describe the declaratory amendments as “eyebrow-raising”
and “provocative.”24
Chapters 5 (“The Legal Showdown”) and 6 (“The Opinion and Its
Critics”) provide a detailed account of the hearing, the reasons, and the
criticisms of those reasons. Chapter 5 is particularly important and useful
because, with some exceptions and for understandable reasons, legal
analysis tends to turn little if at all on the questions and answers during the
hearing. This focus provides excellent context for the deeper meaning and
impact of the Reference for future cases.
Chapter 7 (“The Aftermath”) considers three fairly disparate but
important issues: the apparent conflict between the government and Chief
Justice McLachlin after the release of the Reference,25 the leak of the
longlist and shortlist and Prime Minister Harper’s subsequent abandoning
of any appointments process,26 and the process adopted by the next Prime
Minister, Justin Trudeau (and criticism of that approach).27

20. Ibid at 31.
21. Ibid at 39-43 (see for eligibility issues and the government’s legal options), 43-50 (see for the
Binnie Memorandum), 50-64 (see for criticisms).
22. Ibid at 64-68.
23. Ibid at 79-82; Supreme Court Act, RSC 1985, c S-26, ss 5.1 and 6.1, as added by Economic
Action Plan Act 2013, No 2, SC 2013, c 40, ss 471, 472.
24. Mathen & Plaxton, supra note 1 at 69, 81.
25. Ibid at 125-131. As I will explain below, I would have appreciated more analysis here: see the
text accompanying notes 42 to 44 below.
26. Ibid at 131-134.
27. Ibid at 134-139.
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Chapter 8 (“Judicial Appointments Law”) considers several remaining
issues. It starts with an account of the post-Nadon “Mainville Reference.”28
This subsequent reference was initiated not by Canada but by Quebec,
prompted again by a challenge by Galati to a judicial appointment, but
this time of an appointment of a justice of the Federal Court of Appeal
to the Quebec Court of Appeal.29 The authors then turn to the convention
of regional representation and the ultimately unfulfilled possibility that
the subsequent government of Prime Minister Justin Trudeau might
breach it.30 The chapter concludes with a brief consideration of the Harper
government’s final Supreme Court of Canada appointee, Justice Russell
Brown.31 The authors express compelling dismay that this appointment
attracted little public attention or media coverage, particularly because
the appointment would appear to constitute a breach of the caretaker
convention.32
The final Chapter (“A Court Frozen in Amber”) focuses on the
Reference’s constitutionalization of the Supreme Court Act—which the
authors view as “shockin[g]”33—the controversy over that aspect of the
reasons,34 and the implications, particularly for aspirations of bilingualism,
Indigeneity and other diversity, and regional representation,35 but also for
the appointments process itself.36 Particularly important in this chapter is
an endnote, worthy of inclusion in the body of the text, explaining that
references are formally non-binding but typically treated as if they were
binding.37
The book’s conclusion to some extent bemoans the politicization
of judicial appointments that resulted from the Nadon saga: “If it could
ever have been said that Supreme Court appointments were above
politics, it cannot be said now.”38 In more haunting language, the authors
argue that “[e]xposing the place of politics and power at the heart of
judicial appointments means confronting the unnerving fragility of our

28. Quebec (Attorney General) v Canada (Attorney General), 2014 QCCA 2365.
29. Mathen & Plaxton, supra note 1 at 140-145.
30. Ibid at 145-153.
31. Ibid at 153-154.
32. Ibid (as the authors put it, “once the election writ is drawn up, the government…can (and
must) govern, but it must do so with restraint, generally restricting itself to activities that are routine,
noncontroversial, reversible, or urgent” at 154).
33. Ibid at 3.
34. Ibid at 157-164.
35. Ibid at 164-174.
36. Ibid at 174-177.
37. Ibid at 160/235, n 22.
38. Ibid at 180.
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constitutional order, one in which the guardians of the Constitution are
selected by the very people whose decisions will come under review.”39
The authors describe the purpose of the book in two ways: “The Tenth
Justice explains how [the Nadon Reference] came to be a case, how it
was argued, and why it matters.”40 “There is a reasonable argument that
the Nadon Reference sits alongside…other landmarks in terms of its
legal significance and wider cultural importance. This book makes that
argument.”41
The authors achieved that purpose. Indeed, the particular strength of
the book is the balance struck among the Reference itself, its genesis, and
its aftermath. The authors weave the three parts into a coherent story that
would be unavoidably incomplete otherwise. The book is thus much more
than an extended case comment.
Food for Thought
Overall, Mathen and Plaxton seem to have made a deliberate choice to
mostly refrain from normative analysis and instead leave it to readers to
judge the Nadon saga and the key players within it. While this is certainly
a legitimate editorial choice and has its benefits, I remain curious as to
what the authors really think. To provide so much context for a position,
and then not take a position, leaves the reader wanting more—which is not
necessarily a bad thing. Here I take the opportunity to demonstrate how
the book prompts and provokes important further discussions.
In my respectful view, the authors are not critical enough around the role
and misdeeds of the Minister of Justice and Attorney General for Canada
at the time, Peter MacKay. In their analysis of “The Aftermath” (Chapter
7),42 the authors allocate less than ten pages to the immediate aftermath,
which they subtitle “The Harper Government Versus McLachlin”43
and later refer to as the “the Harper-McLachlin contretemps.”44 (In the
Introduction they describe the incident as “a remarkable attack on Chief
Justice Beverley McLachlin” and a “remarkable public dispute.”45) While
they do mention MacKay’s reinforcement of Harper’s statements,46 as well
as unnamed “senior Conservatives,”47 their focus is on the propriety of
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.

Ibid at 180.
Ibid at 7.
Ibid at 4.
Ibid at 124-139.
Ibid at 125-131.
Ibid at 130.
Ibid at 6, 8.
Ibid at 129.
Ibid at 125.
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the Prime Minister’s actions. Harper surely bears an ultimate leadership
responsibility as the Prime Minister. However, in my view MacKay as a
lawyer and indeed Chief Law Officer of the Crown bears an equal, if not
greater, responsibility, stemming from his professional duty to encourage
respect for the administration of justice.48
On the other hand, the authors do acknowledge criticism of MacKay
for “permitting” the declaratory amendments to be introduced while the
interpretative matter was simultaneously referred to the Supreme Court
of Canada in the Reference.49 To my knowledge, such criticism has been
overlooked in the legal literature.
One of the few shortcomings of the book is its failure to robustly
explain that Chief Justice McLachlin’s decision to raise the eligibility
concern with the Minister of Justice, and her attempt to raise it with the
Prime Minister, was completely reasonable and appropriate. While the
authors note that Chief Justice McLachlin garnered praise,50 they provide
readers little context with which to evaluate whether that praise was
warranted.
It is entirely appropriate for chief justices to be consulted on the needs
of their courts when appointments are being considered, and to initiate
such consultations when the executive fails to do so. An appointment
open to a credible court challenge could—as indeed happened—leave
the court shorthanded for some time. While Chief Justice McLachlin was
unavoidably the chief justice of the apex court that might ultimately decide
such a challenge, she was also unavoidably the chief justice of the court
to which that appointment was being made. Nothing in this paragraph is
original—indeed, I imagine many if not most lawyers and judges would
give a similar account—but its absence from the book is striking and leaves
readers with inadequate context to draw their own conclusions. Indeed,
the Canadian Judicial Council’s recently updated Ethical Principles for
Judges might appear to be a response to this criticism of Chief Justice
McLachlin.51
48. See e.g. Federation of Law Societies of Canada, Model Code of Professional Conduct (Ottawa:
FLSC, 2009, as amended 19 October 2019), r 5.6-1, online (pdf): <flsc.ca/resources/> [perma.
cc/692F-JTMH] [FLSC Model Code]: “A lawyer must encourage public respect for and try to improve
the administration of justice.” I am far from alone in this view. See e.g. Brent Cotter, “The Prime
Minister v the Chief Justice of Canada: The Attorney General’s Failure of Responsibility” (2015) 18:1
Leg Ethics 73.
49. Mathen & Plaxton, supra note 1 at 81-82 (quotation is from 81).
50. Ibid at 130, 131.
51. Canadian Judicial Council, Ethical Principles for Judges (Ottawa: The Council, 2021),
online: <cjc-ccm.ca> [perma.cc/T9NE-S8SL] (“Chief Justices and other judges with administrative
responsibilities will necessarily have contact and interaction with the executive branch of government
[…]” at 44, 5.B.4).
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While reasonable people can disagree, I would ascribe more
responsibility than do the authors to Justice Nadon himself. With respect,
Justice Nadon knew and should have known there could be a controversy
around his elevation,52 and he nonetheless made the deliberate decision to
accept it. While I am not suggesting any mere mortal, including Justice
Nadon, would have the fortitude to decline an appointment to the Supreme
Court of Canada, responsibility comes with choices. The authors’ sentiment
is clearest in the first chapter, where they write that “[t]he heightened
scrutiny [Nadon] received…was somewhat unfair to Nadon, who had
hardly appointed himself to the Supreme Court.”53 The authors emphasize
in their Conclusion that “Nadon was subjected to intense (and arguably
unfair) scrutiny.”54 Moreover, they suggest responsibility lies with the
Court and the government, not Nadon himself: “[t]o many commentators,
Marc Nadon—who was neither a party nor an intervener in the case that
would decide his fate—has been done a great disservice, if not by the court
than by the government that appointed him.”55
On the other hand, the book provides helpful factual context to the
controversial debate—which has only grown since the Reference—
over governments’ (and other parties’) eagerness to commission and
release publicly legal opinions from retired judges of the Supreme
Court of Canada.56 The authors’ treatment and discussion of the Binnie
memorandum is markedly improved over Mathen’s previous work, which
reads as non-committal about the fact that Binnie was clearly acting solely
as a lawyer and in no way acting as a judge: “In the case of the Nadon
memorandum, Justice Binnie could be viewed as acting more as a lawyer
than as a judge.”57 The authors explain that, according to an interview
with Howard Anglin (then “senior adviser on legal affairs and policy”),
the Binnie memorandum was commissioned because the government was
“reluctant” to release its own internal advice: “The government could, of
course, release the opinions provided by the Department of Justice and
52. See also Mathen & Plaxton, supra note 1 (“In an interview with us, Marc Nadon stated that he
had been advised of the eligibility issue when the government first informed him that he was to be
appointed.” at 43).
53. Ibid at 19.
54. Ibid at 179 [emphasis added].
55. Ibid at 182 [emphasis added].
56. See e.g. Amy Salyzyn, “Against Supreme Lawyering,” Slaw (29 March 2019), online: <www.
slaw.ca/2019/03/29/against-supreme-lawyering/> [perma.cc/VY8F-YASC].
57. Carissima Mathen, Courts without Cases: The Law and Politics of Advisory Opinions (Oxford:
Hart, 2019) at 213; characterized as “perturbing” in Andrew Flavelle Martin, “Review of: Carissima
Mathen, Courts Without Cases: The Law and Politics of Advisory Opinions (Oxford: Hart, 2019)
and Kate Puddister, Seeking the Court’s Advice: The Politics of the Canadian Reference Power
(Vancouver: UBC Press, 2019)” (2020) 13:3 JPPL 633 at 641.
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the Privy Council Office, but it was reluctant to set a “precedent” by
which internal legal opinions would be expected to be made public in the
future.”58
While this is a plausible reason for commissioning the Binnie
memorandum, I am concerned that the government may have inadvertently
benefitted from a public and media impression that the opinion must be
correct not because of its reasoning but because it was signed by a retired
justice of the Supreme Court of Canada, and perhaps even that it should
have undue predictive value or weight. Salyzyn describes the issue of
practice by retired Supreme Court of Canada judges as follows:
The worry…is the perception that part of what clients are buying
when they ask retired SCC judges to do such work is that (ex)judicial
imprimatur. It’s common sense that when a client retains a retired SCC
judge to do legal work, part of the reason the client does so is because the
status of “former SCC judge” has gravitas.59

I share Salyzyn’s concerns, particularly as they apply to governments as
clients. Moreover, while any such lawyer may indeed have “impeachable
credentials” (and Ian Binnie undoubtedly does),60 a retired judge is just a
lawyer and his memorandum is just a lawyer’s opinion. While Binnie was
the second retired judge consulted, and the first (the Honourable Louise
Charron) had independently come to the same view, the concern abides.61
In contrast, no such issue would arise from retaining a high-profile expert
lawyer who has never been a judge, as the government then did with Peter
Hogg.62
Enduring Mysteries
Mathen and Plaxton solve several mysteries—in Gillian Calder’s words,
the book is “[a]n intriguing detective story,”63 though it is much more than
that—and they also provide an excellent foundation for further work. In
my view, two enduring mysteries remain unsolved and primed for future
research, one factual and one legal.
The enduring factual mystery remains painfully striking: Why was
Justice Nadon selected? With no disrespect to Justice Nadon, it is fair to
ask what made him the appropriate candidate in the view of the Prime
Minister. Indeed, an eminently fair criticism of MacKay is his conclusory
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.

Mathen & Plaxton, supra note 1 at 41.
Here see also Salyzyn, supra note 56.
Mathen & Plaxton, supra note 1 at 41.
Ibid at 41-42.
Ibid at 41-43.
Ibid at rear cover.
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assurance that “we believe that Justice Nadon is eminently qualified.”64
Why? MacKay was never willing and able to answer that further question.
Indeed, his inability to articulate a convincing account—or even an
unconvincing account—as opposed to conclusory statements is another
glaring failure during this saga. (That is why I favour the processes
proposed in 2004 and adopted by the Trudeau government in 2016, in
which the Minister of Justice answered legislators’ questions.65) Moreover,
in lieu of such an answer to this burning question, MacKay and his office
instead made some legally empty and thus potentially misleading public
statements that Quebec judges on the Federal Court of Appeal had a “right”
to be appointed to the Supreme Court of Canada.66
While this is an impossible question to answer definitively without
candour from Harper or MacKay, I would have appreciated some theories
here. The authors do acknowledge, and provide excellent context to
question, the widespread assumption that Nadon was chosen primarily for
his deferential dissent in Khadr.67 They also suggest that, at least to critics
of Nadon’s appointment, his selection “reflect[ed] a decision, by the prime
minister… that the court itself should be more ordinary and workmanlike
too.”68
Mathen and Plaxton title Chapter 1 “What’s So Bad About Marc
Nadon?,” concluding that “[t]he answer is clear—nothing.”69 But after
reading the book, I am left with the opposite question: “What’s so great
about Marc Nadon?” Admittedly, this is an awkward question to ask. I
write this cognizant of, and indeed I believe in furtherance of, my duty as
a lawyer to encourage respect for the administration of justice.70 I certainly

64. Ibid at 47, quoting Hansard (House of Commons Debates, 41-2, No 2 (18 October 2013) (Hon
Peter MacKay).
65. Mathen & Plaxton, supra note 1 at 27, 136.
66. See e.g. Andrea Hill & Bruce Cheadle, “Don’t exclude Quebec federal judges: MacKay; Home
province shouldn’t be a factor: minister” The National Post (16 January 2014) A6, quoting MacKay:
“Federal court judges who come from the province of Quebec should enjoy the same rights and
privileges for consideration for Supreme Court appointment as every other province”. See also Sean
Fine, “Justice Nadon steps aside while legal challenge heard” The Globe and Mail (9 October 2013)
A3: “Paloma Aguilar, press secretary to Justice Minister Peter MacKay, said the government will
‘defend the rights of Quebeckers who are appointed to the Federal Court to also sit on the highest court
in Canada.’”
67. Mathen & Plaxton, supra note 1 at 14-19; Khadr, supra note 12.
68. Mathen & Plaxton, supra note 1 at 21.
69. Ibid at 20.
70. FLSC Model Code, supra note 48, r 5.6-1. See also commentary 3: “a lawyer should avoid
criticism that is petty, intemperate or unsupported by a bona fide belief in its real merit, since, in the
eyes of the public, professional knowledge lends weight to the lawyer’s judgments or criticism.”
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do not mean to add to what the authors characterize as “withering criticism”
and “ungenerous insinuations…made about his character as a judge.”71
One would idealistically hope, if not assume, that the Supreme Court
of Canada is composed of the best judges in the country, albeit with lots
of room for disagreement over the meaning of “best” in such a context,
or at least “great” judges. With abundant respect to Justice Nadon, I have
no reason to doubt that he is a good judge but I need some context for
why he is a great judge. I appreciate the sentiment of the authors—“there
will always be some metric by which someone other than the person
ultimately chosen could be regarded as ‘better.’ To a degree, weighing one
prospective judge against another is a matter of subjective taste rather than
objective fact.” 72 However, that sentiment only goes so far. Some judges
are historically great, and some are “competent” journeymen like Nadon.73
There is an indisputable and recognizable difference between competence
and greatness. Why not aspire to the latter? If the Prime Minister was
indeed deliberately reducing the gravitas of the Court,74 which is possible
but seems unlikely in my view, that would make a public explanation of
the rationale even more necessary.
I remain perplexed, though perhaps naively, that Justice Nadon has
apparently become a folk hero for elements of the conservative legal
establishment, such as the Runnymede Society.75
The enduring legal mystery is this: can a supernumerary judge be
elevated? This question, though beyond the scope of the Reference and
properly not addressed in the reasons, is intricately interwoven into
the context of the Nadon appointment. It is worthy of future study and
perhaps even litigation. As I mentioned above, Mathen and Plaxton
note briefly in their first chapter the public controversy over Nadon’s
supernumerary status. However, they characterize the issue as one of
“vigour” as opposed to one of law and conclude that “[t]hose comments

71. Mathen & Plaxton, supra note 1 at 10.
72. Ibid at 10: “Traditionally, the bar, legal academics, and the media have been strenuously careful
not to call into question the merits of appointees.”
73. Ibid at 20: “[a] competent judge….To his critics, he was ordinary and workmanlike.”
74. Recall the text accompanying note 68 above.
75. See e.g. Sean Fine, “Libertarian student group Runnymede Society seeks to shake up Canada’s
legal culture” The Globe and Mail (10 September 2019), online: <www.theglobeandmail.com/
canada/article-libertarian-student-group-runnymede-society-seeks-to-shake-up-legal/>
[perma.cc/
RQ8N-7W4U]: “A particular Runnymede favourite is Federal Court of Appeal Justice Marc Nadon”;
Sean Fine, “Doctrine is ‘everything’ for Marc Nadon, the outspoken conservative justice rejected by
Canada’s Supreme Court” The Globe and Mail (2 October 2019), online: <www.theglobeandmail.
com/canada/article-marc-nadon-supreme-court-canada-runnymede-society/>
[perma.cc/VNA667LY].
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were somewhat unfair.”76 Indeed, the authors uncritically accept at face
value Justice Nadon’s dubious “deni[al] that his supernumerary status was
akin to semiretirement.”77 In my respectful view, this denial is much more
troubling than the question of whether Nadon had indeed been drafted into
the National Hockey League,78 which received inordinate media attention
and demonstrates the relative triviality with which the media, the public,
and many politicians approached the hearings.
It is clear that under the Supreme Court Act there is no such office of
supernumerary judge of the Supreme Court of Canada,79 and that under
the Judges Act there is no mechanism for a judge of the Supreme Court to
elect supernumerary status.80 Moreover, for the other federally-appointed
judges for whom an election is available, there is no provision for
revocation of the election. Furthermore, the Federal Courts Act provides
that in the absence or incapacity of the Chief Justice of the Federal Court of
Appeal, or of the Chief Justice and Associate Chief Justice of the Federal
Court, and where the corresponding Chief Justice has not designated a
substitute, those duties flow to the most senior judge who has not elected
supernumerary status.81 These provisions suggest that there is something
lesser about the office of supernumerary justice.
While there is nothing in the Supreme Court Act explicitly rendering
supernumerary judges ineligible for appointment, that does not necessarily
answer the question. I would argue there is a convention – or at least an
implicit assumption—that supernumerary judges have foregone further
elevation and should not be appointed to the Supreme Court of Canada.
Indeed, my guess would be that prior to the Nadon saga, it might never
have seriously occurred to judges, or the Minister of Justice for Canada,
that a supernumerary judge should be considered for elevation.
While columnist Christie Blatchford asserted that the majority reasons
in the Reference “take every opportunity to refer to Judge Nadon as

76. Mathen & Plaxton, supra note 1 at 13-14.
77. Ibid at 13.
78. Ibid at 9-10.
79. Supreme Court Act, supra note 22.
80. Judges Act, RSC 1985, c J-1, ss 28-29, 33.
81. Federal Courts Act, RSC 1985, c F-7, ss 6(2), 6(2.1). See similarly Tax Court of Canada Act, RSC
1985, c T-2 s 5(3)(c). Contra: National Defence Act, RSC 1985, c N-5, s 234(4), concerning the Court
Martial Appeal Court (though the National Defence Act has no provision for a supernumerary election
by a judge of that Court). I leave for another day the question of whether a judge cross-appointed to
the Court Martial Appeal Court can continue in that role once she has elected supernumerary status on
her “home” court.

12 The Dalhousie Law Journal

“supernumerary,””82 the majority only does so three times.83 Blatchford
considers this “language…insulting” and asserts that “[t]he suggestion
is meant to convey something—age perhaps?”84 In contrast, my view
is that even if the language was intended to convey a meaning, it was
not derogatory but reflects perhaps mere surprise and confusion that a
supernumerary judge would be elevated to the Supreme Court of Canada
—and perhaps even a subtle warning that this legal issue may arise in the
future.
Energizing Future Work
At the end of the day, The Tenth Justice is an impressive achievement
that lays a solid and well-researched foundation for future research and
analysis. Indeed, until now the Nadon Reference has attracted less indepth analysis in the legal literature than one might expect.85 Mathen and
Plaxton have thus filled a gap that was not only large but also potentially
weakening to Canadian public law research. I expect the book will provoke
renewed attention to the Reference and its implications and trigger renewed
excitement around its potential to inform important scholarship.

Andrew Flavelle Martin
Assistant Professor
Schulich School of Law

82. Christie Blatchford, “By spurning Marc Nadon, the Supreme Court is also rejecting the
executive’s fundamental role in governance” The National Post (22 March 2014) (WL) [Blatchford].
83. Nadon Reference, supra note 2 at paras 3, 6, and 9. There is also one mention in the SCR
headnote.
84. Blatchford, supra note 82.
85. See primarily Carissima Mathen, “The Shadow of Absurdity and the Challenge of Easy Cases:
Looking Back on the Supreme Court Act Reference” (2015) 71 SCLR (2d) 161; J Gareth Morley, “Dead
Hands, Living Trees, Historic Compromises: the Senate Reform and Supreme Court Act References
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